Introduction
The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 – a sweeping reform of India’s existing Waqf law – has sparked sharp controversy. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) and other Muslim organisations have challenged the law’s constitutional validity in court, arguing that it interferes with their fundamental right to manage religious endowments.
In particular, AIMPLB leaders have announced plans to approach the Supreme Court against the launch of the government’s new “Waqf Umeed” portal, calling it illegal and a contempt of court because the Act is still under judicial review. The parties are sharply divided over whether the amendments unduly intrude on Muslim religious autonomy under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, or are legitimate measures to improve transparency and curb abuse of Waqf properties.
This article explains the background of the reform, the legal issues in play, relevant precedents, recent developments (including AIMPLB’s petitions and protests), and the arguments from both sides.
Background
A waqf is a permanent Muslim endowment of property dedicated to religious or charitable use. Indian law on Waqfs dates back to the Mussalman Wakf Act of 1923 and the Waqf Act of 1954, which was replaced by the Waqf Act of 1995 (amended in 2013).
The 1995 Act and its amendments provide for State Waqf Boards and a Central Waqf Council to oversee Muslim religious endowments.
In August 2024, the Union government introduced two bills – the Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2024, and the Mussalman Wakf (Repeal) Bill – promising to modernise Waqf administration. After intense parliamentary debate, the Waqf (Amendment) Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha on 3 April 2025 (by 288 votes to 232) and by the Rajya Sabha on 4 April.
The President assented on 5 April 2025, making it the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025. (The repeal bill was also passed, abolishing the century-old Mussalman Wakf Act.) The government described these changes as “weeping reforms” intended to improve “efficiency” and curb misuse of Waqf properties.
Key changes under the 2025 Act include abolishing the old concept of “waqf by user” (whereby Waqf Boards could unilaterally declare a property waqf based on long-standing use), making registration of all Waqfs mandatory, and expanding the powers of district collectors and tribunals to resolve disputes.
The Act also mandates the inclusion of non-Muslim members on Central and State Waqf Boards, and requires that any person who creates a Waqf (“waqif”) must have professed Islam for at least five years. Supporters argue these measures enhance accountability and protect public property; critics say they intrude into purely religious matters and target Muslim institutions.
From the outset, many Muslim groups protested the amendments as unconstitutional. In May 2025, AIMPLB launched statewide protests in Telangana, denouncing the law as discriminatory. The Board called the amendments “a conspiracy to usurp and destroy Muslim Waqf properties,” and alleged they violate fundamental rights, including Articles 14, 15, 25 and 26.
AIMPLB said the changes strip Muslims of their historic right to control endowments, noting that other faiths (Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, etc.) “retain protections over their religious properties, whereas Muslims are being denied similar rights”. The Board has publicly appealed to Muslim Waqf administrators and communities to refuse to use the new Waqf portal until the courts decide the issue.
Legal Precedent
Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution guarantee broad religious freedoms. Article 25(1) provides that all persons have “freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice and propagate religion,” subject to public order, morality and health. Article 26 grants every religious denomination the right, among other things, (b) “to manage its affairs in matters of religion,” and (d) “to administer such property by law”. In short, a community’s ability to dedicate property to religious purposes and to govern its institutions is constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court has long emphasised that these freedoms allow religious groups to oversee their affairs, including managing charitable trusts and places of worship. For example, Article 26 was construed in early cases like Shirur Mutt v. Vardhichand (1954) to bar undue state interference in managing religious endowments. Similarly, in Manoharan v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2004), the Court recognised that a mosque’s administration falls within a denomination’s autonomy under Article 26. (Conversely, purely secular activities of a religious endowment may be regulated by law – a distinction often drawn in the jurisprudence.)
In the current challenge, petitioners (including AIMPLB-backed groups) argue that the 2025 Act violates these rights. One recent petition insisted that the law is a “blatant intrusion into the rights of a religious denomination to manage its affairs in the matter of religion, which is protected under Article 26 of the Constitution”. The petition warned that the amendments would “distort the religious nature of Waqfs and significantly harm the democratic process governing their administration,” ultimately depriving the Muslim community of large tracts of waqf properties. In other words, petitioners view the Act as subordinating the religious aspects of Waqfs to political ends.
By contrast, the Centre contends that Parliament may legislate on such matters, so long as the regulation touches only the secular or administrative dimension of waqf management. For instance, the government notes that the 2013 amendments had triggered a massive increase in claimed waqf lands (a 116% rise in “auqaf area”), suggesting that some provisions (like the old “waqf by user”) were being abused to encroach on private or public land.
The state argues that the 2025 law merely requires formal documentation and registration of waqf properties and allows district collectors (as revenue officers) to adjudicate dubious claims and measures aimed at preventing encroachments on government or private lands. Defence counsel have argued that including non-Muslim members on waqf boards is only a limited measure of “inclusivity” that does not dilute Muslim control (Muslims remain the majority on these boards). The Union also emphasises that Article 26 is subject to law and public order: the rights it guarantees are not absolute and can be regulated by general legislation.
Both sides point to constitutional principles. Petitioners invoke Article 25 to claim that dedicating property to God is a protected religious practice, and Article 26 to claim exclusive control over waqf assets. AIMPLB has explicitly argued that these amendments infringe Muslims’ “fundamental rights” and equal protection (citing Articles 14 and 15 as well).
The government replies that its aims are secular and non-discriminatory. For example, it insists that prohibiting new “oral” waqfs without written deeds simply enforces a century-old registration rule for all waqfs, not an attack on religion. The constitutional question is whether these provisions overstep into core religious affairs or remain within permissible administrative regulation.
Relevant Supreme Court precedents on minority rights further colour the debate. The Court has affirmed that the Constitution enshrines secularism and equal freedom for all faiths. It has also held (in cases like St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat (1976) and Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986)) that religious and educational minorities enjoy the right to administer their institutions.
While not about waqf specifically, those principles underscore the general autonomy granted to minorities. Conversely, the Court has permitted government regulation of religious matters when justified by public interest – for example, upholding bans on animal sacrifice or special ceremonies that threaten public order. The balance between these precedents will guide the justices in deciding how far Parliament may go in reforming waqf administration without violating Articles 25–26 rights.
Recent Developments
The Waqf Amendment Act is now the subject of multiple petitions in the Supreme Court. More than 65 challenges were filed in late April/early May 2025 by politicians, activists and Muslim organisations (including MPs Asaduddin Owaisi and Mohammad Jawed, former bureaucrats, civil rights groups, and religious bodies).
The Act has also drawn six BJP-governed states (Haryana, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh and Assam) to intervene in support of the government’s reforms, citing concern that their efforts to combat encroachments would be hampered if the law is struck down.
A three-judge Bench (headed initially by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna) began hearing arguments on 16 April 2025. Over two full days, petitioners urged that the Act discriminates against Muslims and commandeers matters of faith, while the Solicitor General (for the Centre) defended the legislation as a necessary regulation.
At the next hearing on 17 April, the Bench recorded two interim assurances from the Union: that no existing waqf (including historical “waqf by user”) would be cancelled pending the court’s decision, and that no new appointments would be made under the amended law during the proceedings. The court then granted a week for written replies and reserved its order on interim relief.
Amid this, the government announced that starting 6 June, all waqf property registrations must be done via a new web portal called “Waqf Umeed.” AIMPLB immediately protested. On 4 June, the Board issued a statement saying the portal launch is “illegal and a contempt of court,” because it presumes the validity of a law still sub judice. Maulana Khalid Saifullah Rahmani, AIMPLB’s president, urged Muslims and State Waqf Boards to avoid submitting memoranda or registering properties through the portal until the Supreme Court rules. The Board even signalled plans to file a contempt petition against the Centre’s move.
Other recent developments include a related contempt petition over a local incident. In mid-May, a petition was filed alleging that the Uttarkhand authorities demolished the Hazrat Kamal Shah Dargah (a registered waqf shrine) on 25 April 2025, despite an earlier assurance from the government not to touch notified waqf sites. On M13 May the Supreme Court notified the state of Uttarakhand over this alleged violation. These events reflect the tense atmosphere: both sides are on alert, and the Court has signalled to scrutinise even ancillary actions in light of the waqf litigation.
Legal Analysis
At the heart of the legal fight are fundamental rights questions. AIMPLB and its co-petitioners argue that Waqf properties are not ordinary secular assets but are created in the name of God and managed for religious purposes. Under Article 26, they claim, Muslims (as a religious denomination) have an unqualified right to administer these endowments. Provisions that exclude traditional waqf creation methods or impose state-controlled processes (such as committee appointments) are viewed as infringing the “right to manage [their] own affairs in matters of religion”.
The Board’s protest statement frames this as a violation of multiple constitutional guarantees: it calls the amendments “discriminatory” and says they breach Articles 14, 15, 25 and 26. In particular, AIMPLB highlights Article 25’s protection of religious practice: any law that effectively limits who may dedicate property to God or how waqfs are created could be challenged as restricting the free exercise of religion.
Its lawyers note that elsewhere in India, other faiths (e.g. Hindu trusts) enjoy autonomous control over their endowments, and legislative changes are limited. The AIMPLB insists the Waqf Act must be read down or struck insofar as it intrudes on this autonomy.
The Centre counters that the amending Act does not bar Muslims from creating waqfs or administering them; it only prescribes a legal framework. The government’s response emphasises that the Act’s provisions (including non-Muslim board members, dispute resolution by collectors, etc.) are aimed at secular objectives like land record accuracy and anti-encroachment, not at regulating worship or belief.
As one official note explains, waqf boards already voluntarily provided data showing massive increases in waqf lands after 2013 – evidence (to the government) of widespread misuse. From this view, the State’s interest in “transparency and accountability” justifies stricter oversight.
The competing positions raise nuanced constitutional issues. A key question is whether the challenged provisions go beyond permissible regulation of the administrative aspects of waqfs into the realm of religious control.
The Union will argue that legislative power extends to laws on “secular” administration of charitable trusts (Article 13), and that inclusion of other faiths on oversight bodies does not alter the religious character of waqfs. Indeed, the Republic World report of the hearing noted that the Chief Justice remarked Article 26 is “universal and secular in nature” – implying Parliament can uniformly legislate in this field.
Petitioners reply that waqf administration is inherently religious. They note that the Act even amends matters, such as who may become a donor (requiring demonstrable practice of Islam), which goes to the core of religious identity. The AIMPLB protests that no other community’s endowments face such conditions.
They also stress that Article 26 explicitly guarantees the right to “own and administer” religious property. From cases like Shirur Mutt and Manoharan, one can argue that the State’s regulatory power cannot abrogate this fundamental autonomy. As the Board put it in protest, these amendments “take away the rights of Muslims to manage their religious endowments”.
The Court will have to reconcile these views. It may examine, for instance, whether requiring written deeds for waqfs is a neutral standard (since contracts are typically written) or an impermissible curtailment of “oral creation” practices.
It will ask whether giving an executive officer the power to adjudicate waqf disputes is compatible with a religious community’s self-governance. The government portrays these steps as akin to accounting requirements, not interference in worship. Critics warn, however, that under the guise of bookkeeping, the Act could, in practice, deprive centuries-old mosques, graveyards or madrasas (lacking formal deeds) of their waqf status (since “waqf by user” is eliminated).
Another contested aspect is equality. Petitioners have argued the law is discriminatory against Muslims, invoking Article 14 (and even Article 15 and 29) by analogy.
The inclusion of non-Muslims on waqf boards – unique in India – is singled out as a violation of Muslim rights under Article 26. The government responds that this is a limited measure: a majority of board members remain Muslim, and having a few members from other communities is not “usurpation” but inclusion. In any event, even if some provisions were found to violate fundamental rights, the Court could potentially uphold the remainder of the law by severing clauses under Article 13, as long as the core regulatory scheme is rational.
Finally, federalism and the nature of Waqf Boards come into play. Waqf legislation is on the Concurrent List of the Constitution, so Parliament has authority, but State Waqf Boards are constitutionally recognised bodies. Petitioners warn that the Act centralises power in New Delhi (for example, giving the Central Waqf Council greater authority) and strips State boards of autonomy.
Any reading of the amendments will be attentive to the federal structure: can the Centre override States’ management of waqfs, or does it still require State cooperation? (Notably, several States supported the amendments in court, complicating the question of minority vs. federal rights.)
In sum, the legal analysis must weigh the Union’s goal of reform and anti-corruption against the constitutionally protected right of Muslims to self-govern their religious endowments. The Supreme Court has yet to rule, and its decision will likely clarify how Articles 25–26 apply when religious practice intersects with land-use regulation.
Conclusion
The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, has set up a high-stakes confrontation between the government and a prominent Muslim organisation over constitutional liberties. On one side, the Centre asserts that the reforms are secular, necessary checks on abuse, and within Parliament’s legislative competence. On the other hand, AIMPLB and co-petitioners insist the law overruns the community’s fundamental right to manage its religious assets, guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26.
The Supreme Court’s forthcoming judgment will have broad implications: upholding the Act would mean robust state oversight of minority religious endowments, whereas striking down its key provisions could reinforce the doctrinal autonomy of religious communities.
Until then, both sides have marshalled their arguments in court and public debates, with AIMPLB even threatening contempt proceedings over implementing the new Waqf portal. Whatever the outcome, the case will be a principal test of the balance between secular legislation and religious autonomy in India’s constitutional order.
About the author
Ruhan Deb is a third-year law student at Symbiosis Law School, Noida. He is keenly interested in litigation, focusing on Criminal Law and Competition Law. Beyond the legal realm, Ruhan is passionate about global politics and history, complementing his analytical approach to legal studies. His multidisciplinary interests reflect a commitment to understanding law in broader social and geopolitical contexts.