Introduction
Article 12 of the Indian Constitution is the gateway for enforcing fundamental rights. It defines what a “State” is, subject to these rights. Article 12 provides that,“ unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”. In practical terms, Article 12 tells us which bodies – central/state governments, local authorities, or agencies under their control – can be challenged for violating fundamental rights. This matters enormously: only actions by a State (as so defined) can be remedied by constitutional writs (Article 32 or 226). Thus, disputes about whether a particular institution is a “State” are central to constitutional law.
In Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India & Ors. (2025), the Supreme Court grappled with this question. The case asked whether an Air Force School (in Bamrauli, Allahabad) – run by a private society connected with the Indian Air Force (IAF) – should be treated as a State under Article 12. The Court’s analysis of that issue (and its 2:1 split decision) has important implications for public law. We begin by reviewing the background facts of the case.
Background
The dispute arose from two employment cases at the Air Force School, Bamrauli (Allahabad). Air Force Schools were set up in 1966 to educate the children of IAF personnel. They are managed by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society (a non-profit society registered under the Societies Act, 1987). Each school (including Bamrauli) is affiliated with CBSE and overseen by IAF officers (ex officio) on its governing committees. Still, it runs on fees and welfare funds rather than a central government budget.
One appellant, Dileep Kumar Pandey, was hired in 2005 as a physical education teacher at the Bamrauli school (after a public selection process). He served on probation, which was confirmed later. In June 2007, the school declared him “surplus”, offering him either a short-term contractual post or termination. Pandey challenged this decision in a writ petition, arguing that he should be confirmed in service. The other appellant, Sanjay Kumar Sharma, was a commerce teacher hired in 1993 who became the officiating Principal in 2003. He was dismissed following disciplinary proceedings and filed a writ against his termination. Both teachers based their petitions on the claim that the Air Force School was, in law, a State under Article 12. If the school were a State, the High Court could decide its service disputes via Article 226.
Pandey and Sharma pointed out that Air Force Schools are managed under the umbrella of the IAF Educational Society and receive funds and administrative attention from IAF-run welfare schemes. For example, the construction of school buildings often uses Air Force welfare funds, salaries are used for Army Welfare pay scales, and senior IAF officers serve on the school’s committees. They argued this showed “deep and pervasive” IAF control, making the school akin to a government instrumentality. The teachers asked for writ relief to enforce their employment rights.
The respondents (the School’s management and the Union of India) countered that the Air Force School is not a government entity. They explained that the school operates on non-public funds – mainly student fees and voluntary contributions from IAF personnel – with no appropriation from the Consolidated Fund of India. A voluntary society (the IAF Educational and Cultural Society) runs it with its own rules, not by any statute. Crucially, the teachers were employed on private contracts by the Society, not on any statutory government terms. Thus, the respondents said that the school functions independently and that any dispute with staff is a contractual matter, not one involving public law or fundamental rights.
The legal question was straightforward: Does this Air Force School count as “State” under Article 12? If yes, the teachers could seek constitutional remedies. If no, their claims would be ordinary contract disputes outside writ jurisdiction. The issue went to the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court.
Prominent Judgments
- 1. Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohanlal (1967)
A foundational case interpreting Article 12. The Court held that statutory bodies like Electricity Boards, performing governmental functions, fall within the definition of “State.” This broadened the constitutional reach of Article 12 beyond traditional government departments.
- 2. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1962)
Although primarily a case on judicial review and writ jurisdiction, this judgment clarified that actions by public authorities under the colour of law are subject to constitutional challenge. The Court emphasised that a public body exercising statutory powers must act reasonably and within the bounds of law. This principle supports that bodies functioning under a statute, even if autonomous, can attract writ jurisdiction when they violate constitutional rights. This indirectly influences courts’ evaluation of an entity as “State” under Article 12.
- 3. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981)
This case introduced a functional test to determine whether a body is “State” by analysing government funding, control, and whether it performs public duties. It laid down a flexible and realistic standard, significantly expanding Article 12.
- 4. Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002)
The Court clarified and narrowed Ajay Hasia, holding that only entities under deep and pervasive government control can be considered “State.” Mere regulatory oversight is not enough.
- 5. Andi Mukta Sadguru v. V.R. Rudani (1989)
Although the body was private, the Court ruled that writs can lie against private entities performing public functions under Article 226. However, it reiterated that such bodies may not qualify as “State” under Article 12, which has a more stringent test.
- 6. St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava (2019)
Held that private unaided educational institutions are not the State under Article 12 due to a lack of substantive government control, even though they perform public functions like education.
- 7. Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024)
In a case parallel to the Air Force School matter, the Court found that Army-run schools were not State due to a lack of direct government funding and administrative control.
- 8. Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India (2025)
The Supreme Court ruled (2:1 majority) that Air Force Schools do not constitute “State” under Article 12, due to their autonomous functioning and limited government oversight. A strong dissent, however, argued that operational dependence on the Indian Air Force rendered the school effectively part of the State apparatus.
Legal Analysis
Majority Reasoning (Justices Oka & Masih). The majority carefully applied the Article 12 test to the facts of the Air Force School. They emphasised that the school is managed by a private, non-profit welfare society (the IAF Educational & Cultural Society) and operates on non-public funds (student fees and voluntary contributions) rather than government money. Notably, the Court found no evidence that the central government or the Ministry of Defence had any legal or pervasive control over the school’s management. The presence of IAF officers as ex‑officio members of committees did not, in the majority’s view, amount to “all‑pervasive control.” The court noted that the School’s Managing Committee (not the IAF) handles day-to-day administration. Even the Air Force’s own Education Code (1985), under which schools operate, is not a statute and therefore has no binding force over the school. Nothing in law forced the school to adopt every IAF directive – it runs like an autonomous private school.
Next, the Court invoked the well‑known test (from Biswas) that asks whether a body is “financially, functionally and administratively dominated” by the government. Here, the Air Force School failed that test. Financially, the school’s audited accounts showed no grants from public funds; it was not funded by Parliament but by the Society’s funds. Administratively, no law gave the government authority to dictate staffing or policies. The majority pointed out that even if the school performed an essential public function (education), that fact alone is not enough to make it a State entity. Relying on St. Mary’s and AWES, the Court reiterated that “an educational institution, even if it imparts education to children of defence personnel, does not automatically become a State”.
Finally, focusing on the teachers’ complaints, the majority observed that the relationship between the appellants and the school was entirely contractual. In effect, the teachers were private employees of the Society. The Court echoed its earlier observation (in the AWES case) that where employment arises from a private contract, any breach of that contract contains “no public law element”. In plain terms, the Court held: these were private labour disputes, not state actions, so the remedy is a civil suit, not a writ of the High Court. As the majority summed up: “the relationship between the appellants and the said school is in the realm of private contract… [and] does not involve any public law element”. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed as having no merit.
Dissenting Opinion (Justice Amanatullah). Justice Amanatullah disagreed with the majority’s characterisation. He placed weight on the functional and historical aspects of the school. For Amanatullah, the Air Force School was born out of an IAF welfare initiative and served largely IAF families. Crucially, he saw IAF officers (serving officially) wielding significant influence over the school’s affairs. He pointed out, for example, that IAF officers not only sat ex officio on governing bodies but also participated in hiring principals and teachers, and Air Force authorities set the curriculum and pay scales. In his view, these facts showed a “deep and pervasive control” by the IAF over the school. He also viewed education as an essential public service because the school used government-supported funds (like the Army Welfare fund) and served a public interest; its operations should be subject to constitutional review. Amanatullah believed the school’s links to government were more than superficial, making it an arm of the State for Article 12 purposes. On this basis, he would have allowed the writ petitions.
In summary, the Court’s legal analysis turned on the traditional Article 12 criteria. The majority found that the Air Force School lacked pervasive government control – no statute governing it, no funding from the exchequer, and only a supervisory role (not a managerial one) by the IAF. By contrast, the dissent saw those very facts (the IAF affiliation, welfare funding, and functional mission) as evidence of state-like control. The majority’s conclusion – that the school is a private entity and the teachers’ claims are purely contractual – follows established precedent: in Pradeep Biswas’ language, the school was not “financially, functionally and administratively dominated” by the government. Nor was the IAF’s role more than regulatory. Consequently, most held that the Air Force School fell outside Article 12.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Pandey v. Union of India (2025) closes the door on treating the Air Force School as a “State” under Article 12. A 2–1 majority held that the Bamrauli school is managed by a private society with its funds and governance, not the government. The practical effect is that the teachers cannot avail themselves of High Court writ remedies (Article 226); they must instead pursue ordinary civil remedies for breach of contract. As the Court put it, since the teachers were private employees, “the relationship… is in the realm of private contract”, “assuming breach of contract… does not involve any public law element”. This preserves the general rule that only bodies significantly controlled by the State are amenable to fundamental rights enforcement.
The decision has broader significance for constitutional and administrative law. It confirms that institutions run by military welfare societies (e.g. Air Force or Army schools) are not automatically “instrumentalities of the State” simply because they serve a public purpose. It reinforces the Supreme Court’s earlier stance (in cases like St. Mary’s and AWES) that, without the government’s prior statutory or budgetary control, even a public school remains a private body. In practical terms, teachers and staff of such schools cannot bring writ petitions; they must rely on contractual or labour law remedies. Legally, the case sharpens the Article 12 test: courts will look at the government’s actual financial and administrative dominance over an entity, not just its connections.
For administrative law, the ruling emphasises the limits of writ jurisdiction. State action is the touchstone: if a body’s finances and operations are self-managed mainly, it lies outside constitutional scrutiny. Air Force School, Bamrauli, is now settled as a private entity under the Constitution. This guides future disputes: only institutions with sufficiently “pervasive” government control will be classified as the State under Article 12, thereby subject to fundamental rights enforcement.
About the Author
Ruhan Deb is a third-year law student at Symbiosis Law School, Noida. He is keenly interested in litigation, focusing on Criminal Law and Competition Law. Beyond the legal realm, Ruhan is passionate about global politics and history, complementing his analytical approach to legal studies. His multidisciplinary interests reflect a commitment to understanding law in broader social and geopolitical contexts.