Introduction
In June 2025, the Allahabad High Court’s Lucknow bench granted urgent relief to over two dozen madrasas in Shravasti district, Uttar Pradesh. In petitions filed by the Madrasa Moinul Islam Qasmiya Samiti and 26 other institutions, the High Court ordered a stay of “all coercive measures, including demolition” against these madrasas. Justice Jaspreet Singh noted that the state had issued vague notices without proper service or reasoned application of mind, depriving the institutions of a fair hearing. The court directed the state to respond by 3 July 2025 and prohibited demolition or sealing until that hearing. As the court explained, show-cause notices of this kind must be sufficiently detailed so that the noticee can respond specifically and know what charge is to be replied to.
Background – Madrasa Regulation and Recent Crackdown
Madrasas in India operate under both national and state frameworks. The Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004, provides the statutory framework in Uttar Pradesh. That Act established a Madrasa Board (comprising Muslim community members) to set curricula and conduct exams from the Maulvi (Class 10) level up to Fazil (Master’s level). In November 2024, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 2004 Act, recognising the state’s power to regulate madrasa education while cautioning that state regulation must not impair minority character. According to government data, Uttar Pradesh has by far the most madrasas in India – over 14,500 recognised madrasas (out of some 24,000 in the country) – and roughly 1.7 lakh students sat for the UP madrasa board exams in 2023.
In early 2025, the UP government launched a border-area campaign against allegedly “illegal” madrasa constructions on government land. The Shravasti drive was part of a larger anti-encroachment effort in districts bordering Nepal (including Balrampur, Bahraich, Maharajganj, and Lakhimpur Kheri). In April 2025, authorities closed more than a dozen madrasas in Shravasti within a few days – seven on one weekend – often citing missing recognition or ownership documents. Official reports show Shravasti had 297 madrasas, but 192 were “unrecognised” by the state authorities. The district magistrate invoked Section 67 of the U.P. Revenue Act (regarding removal of encroachments) and ordered demolition of madrasas deemed built on government land. A local official noted that many sealed madrasas operated in rented or incomplete buildings without valid approvals. This enforcement campaign triggered the legal challenge. The petitioning madrasas argued that the state’s notices attempted to shut down their religious schooling without a proper legal basis or notice, effectively restraining them from imparting religious education.
Legal Framework and Constitutional Rights
The relief sought implicates fundamental rights and minority protections under the Constitution. Article 25 guarantees “freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice and propagate religion” to all persons. Teaching one’s faith is generally considered part of the “practice” of religion. Article 29 protects any citizen group’s cultural and educational interests with a distinct language, script or culture. It forbids denying admission to state-funded schools on religious or other enumerated grounds. Article 30(1) is especially central: all minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.” Article 30(2) further requires the State not to discriminate against minority-run institutions in granting aid. These provisions reflect India’s commitment to pluralism and minority educational rights. Notably, Article 30(1A) even mandates fair compensation if the state acquires property of a minority institution, safeguarding its property rights.
Landmark Cases
A rich body of case law governs minority educational rights. In T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. Karnataka (2002), an 11-judge Bench held that minorities have the constitutional right to manage schools and colleges of their choice. Still, reasonable, neutral regulations enacted in the national interest may apply to all institutions (minority and non-minority alike). Crucially, Pai emphasised that any such rules must not “destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer a mere illusion.”. In P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005), the Court reaffirmed minority autonomy in professional colleges but allowed the state to enforce merit-based admissions and reasonable fee regulations. The Court explained that Article 30 rights are powerful but not absolute – the state can impose legitimate safeguards (e.g. merit quotas or fee caps) so long as a minority college’s essential character is preserved. Earlier, Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat (1974) confirmed that even minority institutions could admit students beyond the community if consistent with law, and that Article 30(1) does not permit discriminatory exclusion of other citizens when a minority college receives state aid. In Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1985), the Supreme Court held that the freedom of religion in Article 25 included the right of children not to be compelled to sing a national anthem if it violated their faith.
More recently, in the 2024 Aligarh Muslim University case, the Supreme Court clarified the test for minority status. A majority of the Court ruled that to claim Article 30 protection, a religious minority must show the institution was founded by and primarily for that community. Converting to a state university does not automatically nullify minority character if the founders and purposes align with minority interests. The Court instructed that historical evidence (who provided funding, the founding purpose, administrative structure, etc.) be examined to determine if an institution genuinely serves a minority community. The Court underscored that Articles 29 and 30 safeguard the right to cultural and educational preservation: Article 29 protects distinct languages and scripts and bars denial of state-aided schooling on religious grounds. In contrast, Article 30 forbids state interference in minority school administration and requires fair compensation for allocation.
Legal Analysis (Procedural and Substantive Issues)
The High Court’s order engages both administrative law and constitutional rights principles. Procedurally, the court looked at whether the state gave the madrasas a fair hearing before taking action. The petitioners’ lawyers noted that the show-cause notices were vague and poorly served. Indian administrative law and Article 14/21 jurisprudence require that any adverse action follow a fair procedure. The courts have held that “a show-cause notice must be issued with sufficient particularity” so the recipient can respond effectively. Here, Justice Singh echoed that standard, granting the interim stay because the notices lacked clarity of charges and the state had not fully explained its case. The government’s failure to promptly produce records (even after an earlier deadline) suggested a lack of due deliberation. The High Court exercised its writ power under Article 226 to enforce the rule of law, preventing summary demolition until the merits can be fairly heard.
Substantively, the case also invokes minority rights. The madrasas are Muslim institutions, so Article 30 applies. The state is entitled to regulate structures on government land, but it must do so in a religion-neutral way and with due process. If the madrasas are established minority institutions, shutting them down without a compelling justification could violate Article 30(1). The reports mention that official action has treated “religious structures” as illegal encroachments, but any enforcement must respect Articles 25 and 30. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognised that secularism in the Constitution forbids the state from entangling itself in regulating religious instruction. In upholding the Madarsa Act, the Court remarked that constitutional secularism and Articles 25, 28, 30, and 41 all point to a principle against regulating religious teaching. Thus, any government effort to curb “religious education” – even under the guise of land law – requires careful justification. The Madarsa Board Act reflects a legislative balance: it integrates secular subjects (NCERT curriculum) with religious teaching, and the Supreme Court found no constitutional fault with that scheme.
On balance, the High Court’s interim order reflects a precautionary approach: it preserves the status quo of the minority institutions pending adjudication. Suppose these madrasas were indeed illegally built on public land. In that case, the state may eventually lawfully dismantle structures, but it cannot do so in a way that abridges fundamental rights without a full hearing. The court’s emphasis on clear notice aligns with due-process norms. It also indirectly recognised that minority-run schools have protected autonomy: the government’s notices allegedly aimed to “restrain [the madrasas] from imparting religious education” – a restriction that could implicate Article 25 and 30 rights. Any legitimate regulation must be neutral and supported by evidence. As the Court noted, a notice must identify “what charge is to be replied”. This principle upholds transparency in administrative action.
Conclusion
The Allahabad High Court’s order reminds us of the safeguards for minority educational institutions in India’s constitutional scheme. It grants breathing space to the Shravasti madrasas, highlighting that the State’s anti-encroachment campaign cannot override fundamental rights without due process. Stakeholders will await the next hearing (3 July) when the state must justify its notices. The outcome will depend on whether the madrasas can demonstrate compliance with recognition norms or procedural infirmities in the eviction notices. The case underscores the tension between administrative objectives (clearing encroachments) and constitutional liberties (religious and educational freedom). It illustrates that even in land policy matters, the government must respect Articles 25, 29, and 30: citizens are “equally entitled” to practice religion, any cultural group can preserve its language or tradition, and minorities can run their schools. The judiciary’s vigilant review ensures that minority-run madrasas are not deprived of their rights absent a lawful and fair process.
About the Author
Ruhan Deb is a third-year law student at Symbiosis Law School, Noida. He is keenly interested in litigation, focusing on Criminal Law and Competition Law. Beyond the legal realm, Ruhan is passionate about global politics and history, complementing his analytical approach to legal studies. His multidisciplinary interests reflect a commitment to understanding law in broader social and geopolitical contexts.