Collegium System in India – All you need to know about it.

Introduction

It was a bastion of secrecy which went in stayed and decisions made behind closed doors. The Justice Verma incident wasn’t a one-time thing; it jolted people awake. It made the judiciary take a good hard look at a system it had kept hidden for ages. For the first time, people couldn’t just dismiss talk about internal problems as political chatter. The public was angry, and the courts had to show they cared about being honest something everyone had just assumed before. We’re only as holy as the dark spots we’re ready to leave behind.”

Literature Review

Invisible sociology  or cultural anatomy of the collegium.

People talk about the collegium system’s constitutional growth, lack of openness, and clashes with the government. But we often overlook the hidden social aspects of the collegium, how it’s grown into more than just a court process. In real life, the collegium works like a soft ladder where choices aren’t just made but learned through silence, routine, and shared history. The lack of clear ways to check its work isn’t just a mistake. it shows a deep-rooted culture where discretion beats openness and reputation counts more than clear merit. The Collegium system for judicial appointments and transfers, which evolved through decisions of the Supreme Court, is a prime example of this long shadow.[1]

Evolution of collegium system

The evolution of collegium System is evolved from three cases starting at 1981 which are

• S.P. Gupta Vs Union Of India 1981
• Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India 1993
• Third case, judges of 1998

Articles 124 and 217 put it plainly that the judges would be appointed by the president “after consultation,” with the Chief Justice of India (CJI) when relevant, or in the case of High Courts, with the Governor and the Chief Justice of that state. This was a provision for an executive-based system that was somewhat insulated from an individual exclusively executive-led structure. In practical terms, for the first decades of the constitution’s implementation the provisions functioned with relative peace. Although the NJAC had strong support from Parliament and 20 states, it was declared unconstitutional in 2015 by the Supreme Court of India in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record v. Union of India. The Court explained that the NJAC unconstitutional because it violated the basic structure doctrine in relation to judicial independence. The Court affirmed the collegium, but recognized the need for internal reform – yet no real structural reform ensued.

In 2025

Civil society organizations including CJAR (Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms) alleged that the government is “selectively stalling” collegium recommendations. Their allegation revolved around the situation where two advocates withdrew their consent to be elevated when the government delayed acting on the collegium’s recommendations. On the contrary, others such as Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar took potshots at the judiciary’s unwillingness to undergo structural reform, thus reopening conversations about the failed NJAC (National Judicial Appointments Commission) and weighing the balance question between institutional power as dictated by the Constitution. The question is whether  and How much institutional legitimacy and functional credibility has the collegium system, as currently seen and practiced, lost in 2025, and can internal reforms like candidate interviews restore public confidence in the system without compromising judicial independence? And to what extent it can be reformed, or Institutionalised

Methodology –

This research will adopt a multi-dimensional qualitative approach involving doctrinal analysis, case study method, comparative research, and critical discourse analysis, to comprehensively understand the development, current predicament, and future of the collegium system in India, Especially in regard to the significant socio-political events of 2025.

1. Under Article 124 (2) Establishment and Constitution of Supreme Court- Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal on the recommendation of the National Judicial Appointments Commission referred to in article 124A and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty-five years:

Provided that—

(a)A Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office

(b) A Judge may be removed from his office in the manner provided in clause (4).[2]

• Article 217(1): The appointment of High Court judges by the President is to be done after “consultation” with the CJI, the Governor of the State, and the Chief Justice of the respective High Court.
• Article 222: Transfer of judges by the President after consultation with the CJI.
• Article 368: Constitutional amendment provisions pertinent to the NJAC matter.

In the 99^th Constitutional Amendment, provisions invoking Article 368 were made to insert Article 124A,124B, and 124C in order to create the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC).

Maheshwari v. Union of India[3] It was held that The government cannot indefinitely hold up collegium recommendations. A delay in recommended appointments that is indefinite violates Article 14 and results in a failure of judicial efficiency. This case reaffirmed a need to comply with collegium decisions in a timely manner and established a recognition of executive non-cooperation which exists even after NJAC. Furthermore, Justice Kaul emphasized that the Union had withheld eight recommendations among candidates it had submitted recently. The Union accepted and appointed judges from this package of recommendations on a selective basis Justice Kaul stated, that the selectivity of appointments creates uncertainty among unappointed judges as to where they fall in the seniority.[4]

Currently, high courts have 332 vacancies but only 146 recommendation have been made, and there have been no recommendation for the 56 percent of vacancies. The high courts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Meghalaya, Sikkim and Tripura have not recommended names for the vacancies in the lawyers category for five years or more.[5] Majumdar[6] a well-known Delhi High Court IP practitioner was recommended by the Collegium in August 2024 along with two others. By January 2025, her colleagues had both been cleared, while for a year her file continued to languish. By July 5, 2025, she had formally withdrawn her consent on the basis of the unexplained delay and lack of transparency and agency.

CRITICISM and Reform of collegium system

Criticism

1. The most common complaint is that the collegium functions in secrecy. As a body of governance that is not democratically accountable, it does not Publish any reasons for its appointments or rejections because there is no requirement to do so Provide a public or easily understood way to judge selection criteria, and Provide any aspects of its process to the public for scrutiny or feedback.
2. While the collegium maintains superiority of its recommendations, the executive’s intentional disregard for these recommendations
3. Contravenes “timely appointment” (as held in Maheshwari v. UOI, 2023)
4. Contravenes constitutional obligations of “consultation” (Articles 124(a) & 217)
5. Results in competent candidates withdrawing consent for appointment, (see withdraws in 2025).
6. This results in a constitutionally unresolvable deadlock—since there are no statutory timelines, motives that thin the boundary of accountability can nimbly delay—an executive veto disguised as delay.

Reform –

1. While the NJAC was overturned in 2015, the possibility for structural reform was not foreclosed by the court. A modified NJAC could feature a judicial majority, non-political civil society experts, and strong procedural safeguards against executive interference. The goal could still be a constitutional equilibrium none of autonomy or accountability effects can be building reforms that allow public institutions to be involved in the process, not controlling the process. This would not be an alternative to the collegium, but could strengthen it by addressing deeply rooted concerns about exclusion, secrecy or legitimacy.
2. Collegium system has failed to demonstrate the plurality of Indian society, whereby women, SC/ST/OBCs and regional candidates from the subordinate judiciary were glaringly underrepresented. A revised system must embrace affirmative diversity thresholds as an internal criterion for its operations not just token actions and as a matter of institutional justice. A lack of reflection of society in an independent judiciary undermines judicial legitimacy.
3. While appointment is clearly an entryway, a truly accountable judiciary must also develop a system of performance measurement after appointment. Impeachment may serve as a constitutional protection, but it is too drastic and unusual to serve as meaningful accountability mechanism.

Conclusion –

The Establish an independent Judicial Appointments Oversight Committed (JAOC) made up of  Retired judges, Distinguished jurists, Former Election Commissioners/civil society leaders.  The Establish an independent Judicial Appointments Oversight Committed (JAOC) made up of

– Retired judges,

– Distinguished jurists,

– Former Election Commissioners/civil society leaders.

 The JAOC would be advisory – but would: audit trends, submit an annual report to the President & Parliament and recommend best practices. Even if the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed its role as the first arbitrant of judicial appointments and can state its primacy under both the Constitution and earlier Supreme Court case law, it cannot ignore its decline in public trust. Delayed appointments, unexplained rejections, and the informal system of hierarchies will lead to asystem in which merit becomes mystified. A court system operating in this manner, accountable to no one, forfeits the right of serving people rooted in its moral and constitutional authority.

About Author

Mansha is a law student in her final year who has just finished her examinations in the Department of Legal Studies at Desh Bhagat University in Mandi Gobindgarh, Punjab. She strongly believes that research is the essence of law—without effective research abilities, a lawyer lacks the means to make a significant difference. With a strong interest in Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Mansha distinguishes herself through her analytical mindset and dedication to addressing socially relevant and often contentious topics. She is especially attracted to issues that impact not only the legal framework but also the daily lives of citizens throughout the country.

References

[1] How the Emergency birthed the Collegium system – Supreme Court Observer available at https://share.google/vASwyHOw5IiFNMBGZ   last visited 09 July 2025.

 [2] Article 124 Under Indian Constitution available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1164880/ last visited 10 July 2025.

[3] 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2076

[4] Judicial Appointments in Limbo: Supreme Court Expresses Concerns Over Delayed Collegium Recommendations, Supreme court observer available at https://www.scobserver.in/journal/judicial-appointments-in-limbo-supreme-court-expresses-concerns-over-delayed-collegium-recommendations/  last visited 10 july 2025

[5] In report to SC, Modi government ‘blames’ high courts for delay in judges’ appointments available at https://theprint.in/judiciary/in-report-to-sc-modi-government-blames-high-courts-for-delay-in-judges-appointments/1255609/ last visited 10 July 2025

[6]  https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/advocate-shwetasree-majumdar-withdraws-consent-for-judgeship-after-centres-inaction-on-collegium-proposal-296640